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Evaluation is ubiquitous. Indeed, it isn’t an exaggeration to say that we assess actions, 
character, events, and objects as good, bad, cruel, kind, beautiful, ugly, etc., almost every day 
of our lives. A paradigm of evaluation is evaluative judgment. For example, Jen makes the 
judgment that the northwest Scottish Highlands are beautiful, while Phil judges that the rise 
of religious intolerance is a bad thing. Indeed, if we are liberal about how we classify the 
‘evaluative’1 such that it includes the deontic – rightness, wrongness, obligation, 
blameworthiness, etc. – then the pervasiveness of evaluative judgment is even more striking. 
So far, so uncontroversial. A more contentious set of issues arise when we consider whether 
evaluative judgments are expressions of cognitive or non-cognitive states, whether they 
deploy distinctively evaluative concepts, whether they are ever true, or can be epistemically 
justified, etc. Note, however, that recent developments in meta-ethics, in particular the 
emergence of versions of Quasi-Realism
2
, somewhat complicate debates about these 
questions.
3
 For example, if we adopt a deflationary view of truth, then even Non-Cognitivists 
can agree that some evaluative judgments are true. Given this, assuming that evaluations can 
be true, etc., is perhaps not as controversial as it might first seem. In what follows we will 
speak as if evaluative judgments can indeed be true and epistemically justified. 
Historically, it has been thought that a distinctive kind of evaluation is perceptual or 
experiential. Further, some have also believed that this sort of evaluation can be veridical, 
and can play significant roles, e.g., epistemic.
4
 To illustrate: in aesthetics, many philosophers 
have claimed that adequate aesthetic judgment must be grounded in the appreciator’s first 
hand-hand experience of the item judged. Thus, Frank Sibley asserts that  
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“evaluative”. Suffice to say that we are assuming a broad notion. 
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handbook of ethical theory (pp. 146–162). Oxford: Oxford University Press 
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 Note, that as was the case with value judgments, notions of veridicality, etc., can presumably be understood in 
a deflationary sense too. 
we have to read the poem, hear the music, or see the picture (not merely have it 
described in non-merit and even determinate terms if that were possible) and then 
judge or decide whether an aesthetic merit term applies to it or not.
5
  
This claim is often treated as a truism about aesthetic discourse.
6
 Further, some philosophers
7
 
have also made a positive claim about what critical debate involves: that its purpose is to 
bring one’s audience to see the object in a certain way. Some also think that criticism does 
not depend for its plausibility on general aesthetic criteria, if that means deductive reasoning 
from general aesthetic claims, for no such claims are available.
8
 In any case, the point of 
critical discussion is not the formation of belief, but the engendering of perception. Related to 
this, within the tradition from Hume through to Sibley in analytic aesthetics, acquired 
sensibilities of taste (and similar conditions such as a sense of humour) are seen as 
cognitively necessary in the appreciation of aesthetic merit qualities.
9
 This is suggestive of an 
important role for experience in the normative standing of aesthetic beliefs. 
In ethics, Aristotle and modern day Virtue Ethicists such as John McDowell
10
 characterise 
practical wisdom in terms of a perceptual ability. Along somewhat similar lines, other 
philosophers
11
 have emphasised the importance of ethical ‘vision’ as a matter of seeing things 
aright, particularly with respect to its ability to lead us to revise our preconceptions about 
particular objects, persons, and events. As Iris Murdoch puts it, goodness is  
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a refined and honest perception of what is really the case, a patient and just 
discernment and exploration of what confronts one, which is the result not simply of 
opening one’s eyes but of a certain perfectly familiar kind of moral discipline.12 
Elsewhere, Moral Sense Theorists like Frances Hutcheson
13
 seemed to think that an 
emotional or affective experience of moral (dis)approbation constituted our primary 
awareness of moral qualities. 
Contemporarily, there has been continued and renewed interest in the connection between the 
evaluative and the perceptual. We here note five examples.  
Firstly, in aesthetics there has been growing discussion of the idea – introduced by Richard 
Wollheim
14
 – that the phenomenon of Seeing-In, which is often claimed to be typical of 
pictorial experience, marks out a sui generis kind of perception.
15
 Second, a relatively 
substantial literature on the existence and nature of ethical perception has sprung up over the 
last decade.
16
 Much of this has been informed by recent work in the philosophy and 
epistemology of perception. Specifically, (and this is our third example) it has been 
influenced by the emergence of High-Level views
17
 about the contents of perceptual 
experience, i.e., roughly, views which allow that we can perceive (in the canonical 
modalities) complex properties such as natural kinds and other categorical properties. Interest 
in ethical perception has also been informed by recent work on the view that perception in the 
canonical sensory modalities is Cognitively Penetrable, i.e., roughly, perception is susceptible 
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to non-trivial influence from cognitive states like beliefs and desires (more on this later).
18
 
Fourth, there has been much recent interest in the development or further refinement of 
perceptual views of desires
19
, emotions,
20
 and pains
21
 according to which they are 
experiences of value. Fifthly, and finally, there has been some recent work
22
 on the 
connection between the existence of evaluative perception and views in value theory, e.g., 
whether perceptual theories of the emotions are compatible with particular kinds of 
Sentimentalism about value concepts and properties. 
Despite this history and recent developments, there has only been limited interaction between 
philosophers working on these various topics. This volume aims to remedy this by bringing 
together philosophers in aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and value 
theory, to contribute in novel ways to debates about what we call ‘Evaluative Perception’. 
Specifically, they contribute to answering the following questions: 
Questions about Existence and Nature: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If 
so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary 
for certain kinds of experience? 
Questions about Epistemology: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative 
judgments? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified 
evaluative judgments? 
Questions about Value Theory: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or 
undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory 
supported or undermined by the existence of value experience? 
In the following three sections we provide an introduction to some of the main topics of 
discussion, and to the volume papers. 
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Before doing so, the reader should note the following. As shall become clear, the fourteen 
papers in this volume are all concerned with answering one or more of these questions, and 
often cross-cut different areas, e.g., epistemological, value theory, etc. For that reason, it is 
somewhat artificial to divide them into discrete subgroups. However, to aid the reader in 
seeing the connections between the papers, and to contribute to the thematic unity of the 
volume, we have placed the papers into three subgroups. The first is primarily concerned with 
the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception. Here we have placed contributions by 
Dustin Stokes, Heather Logue, Robert Audi, Paul Noordhof, Pekka Väyrynen, Mikael 
Pettersson, and Anya Farennikova. The second group is mostly addressed to question about 
Evaluative Perception and Epistemology. Here we have contributions from Sarah McGrath, 
Michael Milona, Robert Cowan, and Jack Lyons. Finally, the third section is focused on the 
connections between Evaluative Perception and Value Theory. Here can be found the 
contributions by Graham Oddie, Anna Bergqvist, James Lenman, and Kathleen Stock. 
1. Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception 
Many of the papers in the volume are concerned with the existence and nature of Evaluative 
Perception. As we are characterising it, this involves the experiential representation
23
 of value 
properties, i.e., there are some perceptual experiences with evaluative content.  
Before clarifying this and different kinds of evaluative perceptual experience, the 
phenomenon should be distinguished from two others.  
Firstly, there is what we call ‘De Re Perception of Values’24. That is, we perceive objects, 
persons, events, states of affairs that as a matter of fact instantiate evaluative properties, e.g., 
moral rightness, beauty, etc. Everyone but the value Error Theorist can assent to the claim 
that there is De Re Perception of Values. For our purposes, the crucial difference between 
this and Evaluative Perception is that the De Re Perception of some F by a subject is 
compatible with the subject not having what a perceptual ‘experience’ of F, i.e., an 
experience with evaluative content.  
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 Or ‘non-epistemic seeing’. See Dretske, F. (1969) Seeing and Knowing, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
esp. chap. 2. See also Dretske, F. (1993), ‘Conscious Experience’, Mind 102:406 263–283.  
Second, there is what we call ‘Evaluative Seeing-That’. This involves making an evaluative 
judgment in response to a perceptual experience (often it is assumed that the evaluative 
judgment has some positive epistemic status, e.g., constitutes knowledge). One way in which 
some restrict the notion of Evaluative Seeing-That is by insisting that it must be both 
psychologically and epistemically non-inferential, i.e., the relevant judgments mustn’t be the 
result of, nor be epistemically dependent upon inference.
25
 Given this restriction, there is 
scope for philosophical debate as to whether all putative instances of Evaluative Seeing-That 
involve some sort of inferential epistemic dependence (for more discussion see §2 of this 
Introduction). For our purposes, the important difference between this and Evaluative 
Perception is that Evaluative Seeing-That is consistent with the perceptual experience only 
representing non-evaluative properties, e.g., the properties upon which the evaluative 
property supervenes or is consequential.  
Now to clarify Evaluative Perception. Although there is an important distinction between 
non-factive perceptual experience, and perception which is factive, we will mainly focus on 
the former and for ease of expression simply refer to it as ‘Evaluative Perception’. If there is 
Evaluative Perception, in this central sense, then subjects can have perceptual experiences 
that represent the instantiation of evaluative properties of the sort described above, i.e., some 
perceptual experiences are accurate only if they represent evaluative properties. Later we will 
introduce some other phenomena which, although don’t fall under this category, are 
worthwhile considering alongside discussion of Evaluative Perception proper. 
There are at least three different kinds of Evaluative Perception that are worth distinguishing. 
The first of these is what we call ‘Canonical Evaluative Perception’. This involves a 
commitment to the representation of evaluative properties in one or more of the five 
canonical sensory modalities. Some version of this view is defended or endorsed in this 
volume by Robert Audi (at least on one interpretation), Paul Noordhof, and Dustin Stokes.  
The second kind of Evaluative Perception is what we refer to as ‘Affective Evaluative 
Perception’. This involves the representation of evaluative properties in an affective or 
conative state, such as desire, emotion, or pain. On each of these views, the relevant mental 
state apparently shares important features with ordinary perceptual experience, e.g., they have 
phenomenal character, representational content, can be recalcitrant to doxastic changes, 
exemplify some covariance with subject’s environments, and can play a non-inferential 
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 One might go further and provide a positive characterisation of the aetiology of Seeing-That, e.g., they have 
their source in modular perceptual systems; see Jack Lyon’s paper in this volume. 
epistemic role. The point of interest for our purposes is that if such experiences could have an 
evaluative content – and proponents all seem to think that they can, e.g., Oddie26 conceives of 
desires as experiences of goodness, Döring
27
 thinks that moral emotions such as guilt 
represent moral properties, Bain
28
 thinks that pain experiences represent bodily damage as 
bad for the subject – then there could be perceptual experiences with evaluative content, 
albeit ‘non-traditional’ ones. Versions of this view are discussed or defended by Robert 
Cowan, Graham Oddie, Michael Milona and Paul Noordhof in this volume.  
The third kind of Evaluative Perception is what we call ‘Sui Generis Evaluative Perception’. 
This involves the representation of evaluative properties in a sui generis kind of experience 
(by ‘sui generis’ we simply mean that it doesn’t reduce to familiar sensory or affective 
phenomena). One example of this, which is discussed or defended in this volume by Robert 
Audi, Michael Milona, and Pekka Väyrynen, is the view that Evaluative Perceptions are 
‘integrated’ experiences, which are an amalgam of sensory, emotional, and imaginative 
components. This is distinct from, e.g., Canonical Evaluative Perception in part because the 
sensory component of an integrated experience need not have an evaluative content. Another 
example of Sui Generis Evaluative Perception, which is discussed by Jack Lyons in this 
volume, is the view that, although evaluative properties aren’t represented in sensory 
experience proper, they can be represented in perceptual seeming states. Roughly, these are 
propositional non-doxastic states that are the causal upshot of sensory experience or a sensory 
system.
29
 
Due to space constraints, our discussion will be focused on the prospects for Canonical 
Evaluative Perception. However, this will still allow us to make extensive reference to other 
kinds of Evaluative Perception in this section and throughout the Introduction.  
It is first worth noting that Canonical Evaluative Perception runs counter to the mainstream 
view according to which canonical perceptual experience, e.g., vision, only represents what 
are called ‘low-level’ properties such as colour, shape and motion. If there is Canonical 
Evaluative Perception then ‘High-Level’ properties, e.g., aesthetic, ethical, etc., must also be 
represented in perceptual experience.  
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Why would anyone think that there is Canonical Evaluative Perception? One kind of 
evidence – already noted in this Introduction and highlighted in chapters by Audi, Logue, 
Noordhof, Stokes, Väyrynen – is that we often use perceptual language when talking about 
the evaluative. For example, it would not be unusual to hear someone say “the Boticelli looks 
incredible close-up”, or, “I could hear her demeaning tone”. However, this sort of evidence is 
quite weak. Even if we accept that such cases are psychologically (or perhaps even 
epistemically) non-inferential, this doesn’t clearly support the truth of Canonical Evaluative 
Perception, as opposed to some other kind of Evaluative Perception. Indeed, it doesn’t 
obviously support any kind of Evaluative Perception, if such cases can be explained as cases 
of Evaluative Seeing-That on the basis of non-evaluative perceptual experience. 
A more promising strategy is perhaps to appeal to what have come to be known as ‘Contrast 
Arguments’. This sort of argument has been presented by some philosophers of perception, 
notably Tim Bayne
30
 and Susanna Siegel
31
, in support of the high-level (or ‘rich’ or ‘liberal’) 
view of perception, with a focus on natural kind properties, e.g., being a pine tree, and causal 
relations. Very roughly, Contrast Arguments involve conceiving of two experiences with 
very similar or identical low-level content, but where there is plausibly a difference in the 
phenomenology between them, e.g., the contrast between the experiences of looking at pine 
trees before and then after acquiring a familiarity with what their characteristic look is. The 
crucial move in Contrast Arguments is to say that the best explanation of the 
phenomenological difference is a difference in the representational contents of perception as 
opposed to, e.g., attentional differences.  
Put very simply: 
P1: There is a phenomenological difference between target experiences e and e*. 
P2: The best explanation of the phenomenological difference between target 
experiences e and e* requires positing some high-level content, c, in experience. 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 C: (Probably) some experiences have some high-level, c, content. 
Most are willing to accept P1. Thus the central task for proponents of Contrast Arguments is 
to show that positing high-level perception is indeed the best explanation of the relevant 
cases.  
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Is this kind of argument more or less promising in the evaluative case? In this volume Dustin 
Stokes provides a Contrast Argument in favour of the conclusion that at least some aesthetic 
properties, e.g., gracefulness, are represented in canonical experience. Interestingly he thinks 
that this sort of argument is more promising in the aesthetic case than for other high-level 
properties such as natural kinds. Stokes argues that there is no way to account for the 
phenomenology of aesthetic cases without admitting perceptual representation of some 
organisational gestalt, e.g., an organizational gestalt typical of impressionist works. Crucially, 
to experience organisational aesthetic gestalts just is to experience the relevant aesthetic 
properties. Interestingly, this feature is lacking in cases of natural kind or even colour 
properties (a similar view is defended in Bergqvist’s discussion of value theory in this 
volume). 
Against this kind of optimism and the general line of thought, Heather Logue’s chapter casts 
doubt on aesthetic Contrast Arguments. She thinks that there is another quite plausible 
explanation (which is just as parsimonious as positing Canonical Evaluative Perception) for 
the difference in phenomenology: appeal to emotional states (Affective Evaluative 
Perception). Notably, this alternative explanation seems to be absent in the case of other high-
level properties like natural kinds. Logue also considers and rejects arguments in favour of 
Canonical Evaluative Perception of aesthetic properties which appeal to  the putative 
“observationality” of some aesthetic properties – roughly, for an aesthetic property, F,  in 
ideal viewing conditions, if something visually appears to be F, it is F – or to their allegedly 
“superficial” metaphysical nature. Regarding the latter, Logue draws attention to the idea that 
aesthetic properties are plausibly response-dependent (a feature that might complicate Stokes’ 
argument). 
In his chapter Pekka Väyrynen considers a Contrast Argument for moral perception
32
, but 
finds that the phenomenological difference can be explained just as well by a model which 
posits a non-perceptual moral representation results from “an implicit habitual inference or 
some other type of transition in thought which can be reliably prompted by the non-moral 
perceptual inputs jointly with the relevant background moral beliefs”33. The representations 
involved may be affective in nature (hence Väyrynen may be interpreted as countenancing 
the existence of Affective Evaluative Perception or Sui Generis Evaluative Perception). 
Further, he thinks that this alternative model possesses theoretical virtues of simplicity and 
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33
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unity that gives it an advantage. Positing Canonical Moral Perception adds no explanatory 
power. Thus P2 of a moral Contrast Argument should be rejected.
34
  
Another kind of argument that could be offered in favour of Canonical Evaluative Perception 
is epistemological: 
P1: There could be a certain kind of justified belief, J, only if there were Canonical 
Evaluative Perception. 
 P2: There is justified belief J.  
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 C: There is Canonical Evaluative Perception.  
P1 claims that Canonical Evaluative Perception is a necessary condition for a particular kind 
of epistemic justification (a similar argument could be constructed for knowledge and other 
positive epistemic properties). We will postpone discussion of this idea until §2 of the 
Introduction. For now note that Logue discusses and rejects this sort of epistemic argument in 
her chapter.
35
 
Even if one is somewhat sympathetic to arguments in favour of Canonical Evaluative 
Perception, there remains, inter alia, the question of how value properties could be 
represented in experience. For example, it might seem highly implausible that value 
properties are represented in a similar way to that in which low-level properties like colours 
and shapes are represented in vision. This point is not only noted by opponents of Canonical 
Evaluative Perception – see Jack Lyons’ paper in this volume – but also by proponents of the 
view, such as Audi and Noordhof (both in this volume). Whether or not this fatal for the view 
depends upon whether we allow that there are different kinds of representation in perceptual 
experience. For example, Audi distinguishes, inter alia, between what he calls the 
“perceptual”, associated with “cartographic”, “pictorial” and “basic” representation (the sort 
allegedly involved in the representation of colours and shapes), and the “perceptible”, which 
involves non-cartographic, non-pictorial, and non-basic representation. Crucially, he seems to 
think that some perception (in the canonical modalities) is of the perceptible. Noordhof also 
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 Väyrynen thinks that whether a Contrast Argument is likely to succeed depends on the properties in question, 
and his view is that it is a good deal less promising in the moral case as compared with other high-level 
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35
 Robert Audi, in this volume, also suggests the following sort of argument for moral perception: if there is 
perception of emotion, e.g., anger, then there is little reason to doubt the existence of moral perception. Of 
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distinguishes between “sensory” and “non-sensory” representation in canonical perception.36 
If we admit that there can be different kinds of perceptual representation, then Canonical 
Evaluative Perception may be a good deal more plausible. 
One thing that makes it difficult to determine whether there really is Canonical Evaluative 
Perception is that it is hard to see how we can satisfactorily resolve disputes between those 
who, like Audi and Noordhof, think that there is something like non-sensory representation, 
and those, like Lyons, who think that what is being referred to as non-sensory perceptual 
representation is actually something post-perceptual, e.g., a perceptual seeming state which 
has phenomenal character (though perhaps it is bland character) and conceptual content. 
Note, however, that Noordhof provides arguments in favour of admitting non-sensory 
representation (one which appeals to the phenomenology of chicken sexers and speech 
perception, the other which appeals to epistemic considerations), as well as reasons for 
doubting the existence of perceptual seemings in his chapter. Also, in this context it is worth 
noting Heather Logue’s view that there may not be a fact of the matter regarding the question 
of whether aesthetic properties are represented in canonical perceptual experience. 
Even if one allows that there can be non-cartographic or non-sensory perceptual 
representation, e.g., perhaps this is what all high-level representation involves, some still 
might think that there are specific problems for Canonical Evaluative Perception. In his 
chapter, Noordhof thinks that there may be some resistance to the idea of Canonical 
Evaluative Perception even among those who countenance non-sensory representation 
because of the common thought that value properties are in some way response-dependent 
(also highlighted by Logue)
37
. In order to address this, Noordhof presents an account of 
intrinsic response-dependent representation – i.e., representation of a property that has 
nothing to do with the representation standing in relation to something independently 
characterised in the world. He illustrates this with reference to the perception of badness in 
pain and moral perception. 
Suppose that a plausible argument can be made for thinking that there is Canonical 
Evaluative Perception. To support this, proponents will need to identify psychological 
mechanisms by which this could take place. This is, of course, an empirical matter that can’t 
plausibly be settled from the armchair.   
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37
 Noordhof also thinks that there is a lack of ‘phenomenal presence’ in the case of aesthetic and moral 
representation, though not in the case of the representation of badness in pain experience. 
One candidate model that has received attention in the recent literature on moral perception is 
that Canonical Evaluative Perception could be brought about by a process of Cognitive 
Penetration.
38
 Roughly, Cognitive Penetration of sensory experience is possible if and only if 
it’s possible for two subjects to have experiences which differ in content and/or phenomenal 
character, where this difference is the result of a causal process that traces more or less 
directly to states in the subjects’ cognitive system, and where we hold fixed the perceptual 
stimuli, the condition of the subjects’ sensory organs, the environmental conditions, and, the 
attentional focus of the subjects.
39
 
Potential cognitive penetrators include moods, beliefs, desires, emotions, and character traits. 
Such a model might help to explain how there can be expertise with respect to values, e.g., in 
aesthetics. What the expert has, and the novice lacks, is a set of background commitments 
that cognitively penetrate their sensory experience such that it comes to have an evaluative 
content.  
Although there is growing evidence for the Cognitive Penetrability thesis
40
, it is still highly 
controversial. It is therefore worth noting that adopting the Cognitive Penetrability model 
requires proponents of Canonical Evaluative Perception to undertake substantial empirical 
commitments regarding the capacities of ordinary perception and its relation to cognition. In 
this volume, Bergqvist, Cowan, Lyons, Pettersson, Stokes and Väyrynen discuss Cognitive 
Penetration. 
Another model appeals to Perceptual Learning, which involves a repeated associative process 
that takes place within the perceptual system. For example, after repeated exposure to a 
particular kind of artwork (and top-down processing within the visual system) perhaps one’s 
visual system may come to encode information about aesthetic properties. Stokes discusses 
this possibility in his volume chapter. If we think that there is such a thing as aesthetic 
expertise, one might think that one feature that distinguishes the expert from the novice is that 
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they have been repeatedly exposed to artworks. Note, however, that a similar sort of repeated 
exposure may be less common in the moral case (although this might be overstating things).  
A final model for Canonical Evaluative Perception is that our perceptual systems are hard-
wired for evaluative representation (in the way that representation of colours and shapes 
seems to be). One might think that a necessary condition for perceptual hard-wiring is that 
possessing the relevant representational powers will be of use to subjects who possess them 
in almost any environment in which they might be placed.
41
 Notice that, while it is not 
implausible that moral properties meet the necessary condition, it is perhaps a good less so 
for kind properties, e.g., being a pine tree, and aesthetic properties.  
In this volume, Robert Audi may be interpreted as defending a sort of hard-wired view about 
Evaluative Perception, however, it is not entirely clear whether he is willing to countenance 
this for Canonical Evaluative Perception or only for a kind of Sui Generis Evaluative 
Perception (integrated experiences). Finally, it is worth noting that in the case of Affective 
Evaluative Perception – regarding emotion and pain in particular – philosophers seem to be 
more sanguine about the claim that evaluative representation is hard-wired. 
Although the majority of the papers in the volume are engaged in debates about Evaluative 
Perception (as we have defined it), two of the volume papers – those by Mikael Pettersson 
and Anya Farennikova – discuss distinct kinds of phenomena which we think are usefully 
grouped with these other papers.  
Firstly, there is the phenomenon of Seeing-In, typical of pictorial representation, which – as 
noted earlier – some have thought marks out a distinctive form of perception. For instance it 
is often said that an important part of our experience of pictures, such as looking at a wedding 
photograph in the family album, is that we see its subject matter “in” its surface, in a way that 
is different from watching the world (its pictorial content) face-to-face.  
In his chapter, Mikael Pettersson problematises extant accounts – resemblance42 and 
recognitional
43
 – of Seeing-In by considering how they fare with respect to the phenomenon 
of seeing empty space in pictures. Although seeing empty space in a picture (and seeing-in 
more generally) isn’t a form of Evaluative Perception (as we have defined it), the alleged 
distinctiveness of this form of perception, and its apparent significance for aesthetics, e.g., the 
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aesthetic appreciation of some pictures will depend on our experience of empty space or void 
in the picture, make inclusion of discussion of this topic in this collection important. 
Pettersson rejects cognitive accounts of seeing empty space in pictures (what we earlier 
referred to as Seeing-That) and goes on to sketch an imagination theory of our experience of 
seeing empty space in pictures, which according to one model involves the cognitive 
penetration of perceptual experience by imagination. 
The second phenomenon is that of perceptual experiences which, though not themselves 
Evaluative Perceptions, are nevertheless allegedly causally dependent for their occurrence 
upon subjects having certain sorts of evaluative commitments. For example, perhaps 
possessing certain aesthetic beliefs makes one more perceptually attentive to particular low-
level features of artworks, e.g., colour and shape arrays, even if such experiences don’t 
represent the instantiation of evaluative properties. In addition, we might include affordances, 
as a related kind of evaluative perceptual experience that represents not an evaluative 
property as such but rather features of the perceived lived environment that bear intimately on 
action in reasonable perceptual agents – such as giving up one’s seat on the bus upon seeing a 
visibly tired person.
44
 Rather than an Evaluative Perception, these are perhaps better called 
‘Value-Enabled Perceptions’.  
In her volume paper Anya Farennikova argues that perceptual experiences of absences, e.g., 
seeing that Pierre is not in the café, or noticing the absence of a ring on someone’s fourth 
finger, are dependent upon the subject’s desires or values. Roughly, the idea is that desiring 
and valuing more generally can make one perceptually sensitive to the existence of the 
absence of certain things in one’s environment. Without those values, one wouldn’t recognise 
what isn’t there. Thus, Farennikova thinks that one’s desires enable the perception of 
absences: they are value driven experiences.  
2. Epistemology and Evaluative Perception 
As was noted in the previous section, one kind of argument that is sometimes offered in 
favour of Canonical Evaluative Perception is epistemological. What is perhaps the crucial 
premise in that argument claims that Canonical Evaluative Perception is necessary for the 
existence of some kind of justified evaluative belief or knowledge. One candidate might be 
the existence of justified evaluative beliefs about concrete particular cases, e.g., John’s 
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judgment that the hoodlums were wrong to set fire to the cat, or Lucy’s belief that the lead 
ballerina’s movements in the final act were graceful. 
In this volume there are several papers that argue against this sort of view. In her chapter, 
Logue at one stage suggests that a (broadly-speaking) inferentialist picture could perhaps 
accommodate justified beliefs in aesthetic cases, e.g., Lucy’s justified belief about the 
gracefulness of the ballerina might be the result of her justified background belief that 
features F, G, H are usually sufficient for movements to be graceful, and the belief or 
perceptual registering that the ballerina possesses those features.  
In her paper, Sarah McGrath – focusing primarily on moral perceptual knowledge – argues at 
length against versions of inferentialism (albeit focused on moral cases): deductive, 
inductive, and abductive. These models allegedly fail to adequately explain moral knowledge 
in particular cases. She also considers and rejects a more sophisticated Inferentialist model 
found in the work of Kieran Setiya
45, according to which the relevant moral ‘perceptual’ 
knowledge is actually inferred from non-moral evidence. However, McGrath doesn’t think 
that Canonical Evaluative Perception is necessary for justified belief or knowledge in the 
relevant cases. Instead, she argues that a non-inferential Evaluative Seeing-That is sufficient. 
Interestingly, McGrath argues that such non-inferential ‘perceptual’ judgments about 
particular concrete cases – as opposed to judgments about hypothetical cases which are 
implicitly general
46
 – can play an important and hitherto unrecognised role in the process of 
arriving at reflective equilibrium.  
Jack Lyons, in his volume chapter, also argues – from an epistemological Reliabilist 
perspective – that the sort of justification that one might have thought could only be gained 
by Canonical Evaluative Perception, can also be delivered by Sui Generis Evaluative 
Perception (perceptual seemings), or what he calls ‘value intuitions’, i.e., cognitive seemings 
with evaluative content.  
Finally, a more extreme version of the view that Canonical Evaluative Perception plays some 
epistemically essential role would claim that it is required for the existence of any justified 
(substantive) evaluative belief. In his volume chapter, Michael Milona argues against this
47
, 
concluding that for any substantive justification gained from Canonical Evaluative 
Perception, subjects could gain the similar justification by imaginatively considering the 
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relevant cases and having some sort of affective, e.g., emotional, response to it. Indeed, 
Milona goes further and claims that the question of whether there is Canonical Evaluative 
Perception is not important at all for debates about evaluative epistemology (but recall 
McGrath’s point about the epistemic significance of perceptual evaluative judgments). Note, 
however, that Milona seems to think that Affective Evaluative Perception – desires or 
emotions – is a necessary condition for justified substantive evaluative beliefs. We’ll return to 
this view shortly. 
Even if Canonical Evaluative Perception isn’t necessary for evaluative justification (and thus 
epistemological arguments for its existence are likely unsound), we can ask whether it could 
be sufficient for justified evaluative beliefs. Further, if it turns out that Canonical Evaluative 
Perception were sufficient for basic or non-inferential justification then it could still have 
some epistemological significance, i.e., it could be a source of regress-stopping justification. 
Is it? 
On one view of non-inferential experiential justification, in order for an experience to 
immediately justify a belief that p, this requires that the experience has distinctively 
presentational content with respect to p. Being presented with p is meant to differ in 
important respects from representing p (contrast seeing a red ball with simply thinking about 
one). In this volume, Noordhof claims that the moral perception lacks presentational 
character in a way that other sorts of Evaluative Perceptions, e.g., pain experiences, do not. 
He suggests that this impacts on the former’s capacity to confer justification. On the other 
hand, Audi has no problem with the idea that moral perceptions could be presentational. One 
explanation for the difference in view is that there are competing views of what 
presentational content is.
48
 Which is the correct view arguably needs to be settled on 
independent grounds.  
If one thinks that non-inferential epistemic justification requires reliability, or that evaluative 
knowledge requires reliability, then one needs to give an account of how Canonical 
Evaluative Perception could be reliable. Robert Audi’s considered view – in the moral case – 
is that this has something to do with the possession of moral concepts. However, one might 
wonder how concept possession could make one reliable in this way, and whether this 
renders the relevant knowledge/justified belief non-empirical. An alternative view is that 
reliability will depend upon the background beliefs or value commitments that one has. 
                                                          
48
 For a particular conception, see Chudnoff, E. (2013), Intuition, Oxford University Press.  
However, one might worry – as Väyrynen does in his volume chapter – that this introduces 
an epistemic dependence that is antithetical to non-inferential justification. In this context it is 
worth noting Lyons’ argument (in this volume) against the view that causal cognitive 
influence (penetration) on some mental item should lead us to posit some sort of epistemic 
dependence relation. Instead, what matters is whether the cognitive influence is such that the 
mental item can be said to be based upon the influencing cognition. So even if Canonical 
Evaluative Perception is brought about by cognitive penetration by background beliefs, if this 
doesn’t involve basing then this would be consistent with Canonical Evaluative Perceptions 
being sources of immediate justification or knowledge (so long as they are reliable).     
As was noted earlier, Michael Milona suggests that Affective Evaluative Perceptions could 
be sources of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs (indeed, he appears to suggest that 
they may be necessary for such justification). However, one might wonder whether emotions, 
e.g., could be sources of immediate justification, if they are always grounded in “cognitive 
bases”49, e.g., beliefs, perceptions, imaginative episodes concerning non-evaluative objects 
and events. For example, David’s guilt is based upon his belief that he lied to his partner. One 
might think that for his guilt to justify an evaluative belief, e.g., that he has done something 
wrong, his belief about having lied must be justified. But then that looks like his emotion 
isn’t a source of immediate justification. Further, this sort of basing/epistemic dependence 
might make us doubt that emotions really are Affective Evaluative Perceptions (similar points 
could be made about desires). In this volume, Robert Cowan argues that even if all emotions 
have cognitive bases, and even if this entails an epistemic dependence of the emotion upon 
the cognitive base, this is compatible both with emotions playing an epistemically 
fundamental role with respect to evaluative propositions.  
3. Value Theory and Evaluative Perception 
If we define Evaluative Perception in terms of a non-factive representational state, then it 
might seem as though there are little or no connections between its existence and questions in 
value theory about, e.g., the metaphysics of values.  
However, that’s a bit quick (see also Noordhof and Stokes, this volume). To illustrate, 
consider a simple Sentimentalist view of value properties (a similar view could be developed 
about concepts), according to which X possesses value property, F, iff X elicits emotional 
response, E, from all who consider X. One way to understand this view would be as a 
                                                          
49
 See Deonna, J. & Teroni, F., (2012), The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction, Routledge, p. 5. 
 
reductive analysis of value properties, i.e., the right hand-side has explanatory priority. 
However, if emotional responses have evaluative content, e.g., guilt represents wrongness, 
that might problematise a reductive version of this view (since the right-hand side will make 
reference to value properties, albeit the representation of such properties). This might push us 
in the direction of some other kind of account, e.g., a no-priority view. 
Even if one has doubts about the previous line of thought, if we assume that at least some 
Evaluative Perceptions are veridical, and that they can play some epistemic role, e.g., prima 
facie justify evaluative beliefs, then there are arguably clearer connections between the 
existence of Evaluative Perception and Value Theory. For example, it has recently been 
argued
50
 that a view according to which emotions are Affective Evaluative Perceptions, 
which can non-inferentially justify evaluative beliefs
51
, is incompatible with Neo-
Sentimentalism about value concepts – according to which X possesses value property, F, iff 
X merits or justifies an emotional response from those who contemplate X, E, e.g., X is 
admirable iff X merit admiration. This is because the combination would appear to have the 
counterintuitive consequence that emotions can confer justification for themselves.
52
 
In this volume Graham Oddie defends the view that desires are Affective Evaluative 
Perceptions, i.e., they are experiences of the goodness of things that can confer prima facie 
justification for evaluative beliefs about goodness. However, Oddie argues that if we think 
states of affairs are the primary bearers of value, then the view that desires are value 
perceptions faces an isomorphism problem. On the one hand, if there is Affective Evaluative 
Perception then it might seem that it ought to be reflective of the evaluative facts. Certainly, it 
seems that our evaluative beliefs ought to be this way. But on the other hand, it seems that at 
least some kinds of value experience – in particular emotional and desire experiences – are 
legitimately perspectival, e.g., it seems legitimate for me to prefer that my mother be saved 
rather than someone else’s in a scenario where only one can be saved. After suggesting a 
somewhat metaphorical way of addressing this (which appeals, inter alia, to value distance), 
Oddie suggests that the isomorphism problem can be dealt with if we adopt the view that 
properties/states of being, e.g., being happy, are the primary bearers of value and objects of 
desire. This is because Oddie thinks properties, in particular, “local” properties (a property 
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that can be borne by one thing without everything possessing it), have their own “built-in” 
perspective. 
In her paper, Anna Bergqvist also considers the perspectival nature of evaluative perception. 
On Bergqvist's reading of Iris Murdoch, moral perception does not only involve the idea of 
being attuned to one's environment thanks to cognitive penetration through the concepts that 
we deploy, but also the claim that one's conceptions of these concepts decisively influence 
what we see. Bergqvist argues that we can nonetheless make good on the robust realist claim 
that the salient concepts of an individual's life-world can be revelatory of value without 
appeal either to Platonism or value-constitutivism. Bergqvist distinguishes two readings on 
the concept of 'non-perspectival value': an epistemic and reading and a non-epistemic one, 
and argues that commitment to the thesis that value is in some sense always value for us does 
not as such rule out value's being non-perspectival in the sense of existing independently of 
any actual worldviews or perspectives in the non-epistemic sense. Bergqvist considers the 
possible objection as to how to account for the notion of structure and unity of moral thought 
if we follow through on Murdoch's suggestion and take the central target notion of worldview 
to be an unruly holistic admixture of evaluative and non-evaluative concepts: are there any 
limits as to what might plausibly be counted as "value for us"? In her estimation, what is 
needed is a separate argument that speaks to the practicality of thick moral concepts as 
action-guiding concepts, and the notion of action-oriented perception more generally. 
By contrast with Bergqvist’s perspective-neutral view about the nature of value, in his 
volume paper James Lenman explores the topic of Evaluative Perception within the context 
of a broadly Expressivist (or Quasi-Realist) metaethical framework. According to this 
metaethical view, our reasons for action (including moral reasons) emerge out of a relatively 
stable network of desire-like attitudes and commitments, arrived at via some process of 
reflection and deliberation. Despite a sort of ultimate dependence of reasons on desire, it can 
apparently still make sense to speak – from within our web of commitments – of desire-
independent moral reasons and moral truth within this framework. With this view on the 
table, Lenman rejects the idea that Canonical Moral Perception takes place: this sort of 
position would only seem to make sense if we assumed some sort of naturalist realism. Even 
then, Lenman thinks that the real epistemic work would be done by moral theorising about 
the relation between natural and moral properties, not sensory perception. Instead, he affords 
a limited role to Affective Evaluative Perception (emotions and desire) in disclosing value to 
us, where the latter process is understood more as self-interpretation rather than some sort of 
perceptual-like engagement with an external evaluative reality. However, it is clear that 
Lenman is more favourable to a picture of ethical thought as reflective and interpretative, 
rather than immediate and perceptual. 
Finally, in her volume chapter, Kathleen Stock appeals to a particular kind of perception in 
order to illuminate a particular kind of practice with evaluative and normative significance: 
objectifying behaviour, i.e., treating people like objects. Specifically she argues that a 
mediating role between objectifying images (e.g., those found in pornography) and 
objectifying behaviour is played by a distinctive kind of perception: what she calls ‘mind-
insensitive seeing-as’. This amounts to a mode of perceiving people on a par with looking at 
mindless inanimate objects, and involves a sort of Gestalt which can come in various types, 
e.g., seeing-as body, seeing-as fungible. Positing this phenomenon explains some important 
kinds of objectifying behaviours, e.g., the attentional and cognitive habits towards members 
of objectified groups. Now, although the sorts of experiences that Stock appeals to may not 
themselves have an evaluative content (strictly-speaking), they may be said to be evaluative 
perceptions in a broader sense, due to the morally significant way they involve presenting 
their intentional objects (persons). Even if it were objected that the phenomena that Stock 
points to is not a class of Evaluative Perception, one significant feature is worth noting. The 
experiences that Stock describes would themselves seem to be the appropriate object of 
evaluation, whether or not they represent value properties, i.e., they nevertheless constitute 
Morally Evaluable Perceptions. 
 
